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Dude Looks Like a Lady:* Protection
Based on Gender Stereotyping
Discrimination as Developed in Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises
Geoffrey S. Trotiert

I.

Introduction

Once upon a time, in a great big office building, in a time not
too far in the past, there worked three bears. Big Bear worked in
the top floor of this office building for an extremely prestigious law
firm. Every morning Big Bear would leave the house he shared
with his same-sex partner, whom his colleagues had never met.
He would work into the wee hours every day to meet his billable
hour requirement, all the time hoping that he was behaving with
sufficient masculinity and more than a little bit of homophobia so
that his co-workers would never guess his sexual orientation.
On the tenth floor of this office building, Lady Bear managed
a branch office of a major accounting firm.1 With her strong,
aggressive, and sometimes ruthless administrative style, she had
expanded a tiny satellite office into an enormous growth success.
However, Lady Bear had been informed by management that due
to her lack of feminine deportment, she would never be transferred
to the coveted position at corporate headquarters which, by her
experience, she had expected to receive.
On the second floor, Little Bear worked as a server and host

Aerosmith, Dude (Looks Like a Lady), on PERMANENT VACATION (Geffen Records,

Inc. 1987).
t J.D. expected 2003, University of Minnesota. Artist Diploma 1999, University of
Cincinnati College-Conservatory of Music. M.M. 1997, University of Cincinnati
College-Conservatory of Music. B.M. 1993, Northwestern University. I would like
to thank Susana Diaz and members of my family for their love and unflagging
support throughout my education. I would also like to thank Rumna Chowdhury,
Karen Olson, and Maura Shuttleworth for their feedback, encouragement, and
dedication throughout this project.
1. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding
that an employer may not discriminate against a woman in the workplace for
failing to comport with stereotyped expectations of femininity).
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at the office building's bistro. Now, Little Bear could not quite be

described as a "man's man." Little Bear loved the theatre, opera,
and art. On any given Saturday, he could be found flipping past
the myriad of college football games to watch competitive figure
skating. In addition, Little Bear had the remnants of a childhood
speech impediment and slightly "graceful" gestures. While Little
Bear never disclosed his sexual orientation at work, his co-workers
clearly asserted their opinions on the subject.
Although the three bears in our story seem like radically
different personalities, they all have a significant commonality.
None of them have always had federal protection for their inability
to conform to their prescribed gender stereotypes, regardless of
whether this nonconformity stems from sexual orientation, gender2
prescribed behavior, or a combination of orientation and behavior.
While this "fairy" tale may seem rather silly and out of place in a
legal journal article, it aptly illustrates the kind of bedtime story
that would give nightmares to the modern gay man or lesbianuntil the Ninth Circuit's July 2001 ruling in Nichols v. Azteca
3
RestaurantEnterprises.
The appellant in Nichols, Antonio Sanchez, was a former
employee of Azteca Restaurant Enterprises. 4 Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),5 Sanchez claimed that he

was subjected to a hostile work environment because of frequent
verbal abuse concerning his lack of masculinity. 6 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez had suffered discrimination due
to a hostile work environment and that abuse by male employees
stemming from his mannerisms that comported with a female
stereotype was "because of sex" with regard to Title VII.7
2. See infra notes 23-119 and accompanying text.
3. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. See id. at 869 n. 1, 870. The Ninth Circuit addressed the claims of Sanchez's
co-plaintiffs in an unpublished memorandum disposition filed concurrently with
this opinion. See id. at 869 n.1; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., No. 99-35579, 2001
WL 804002 (9th Cir. 2001).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1994). Sanchez also brought this action
under the Washington state law counterpart of Title VII, the Washington Law
Against Discrimination (WLAD). See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869. WLAD does not
specifically protect on the basis of sexual orientation. WASH. REV. CODE §
49.60.010 (2001). Instead, it offers protection under language similar to that of

Title VII. See id.
6. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869.
7. Id.
This decision abrogated the Ninth Circuit's previous holding in
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir.
1979), which stated that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition only offered
protection from discrimination based on "gender." Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875. See
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In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit determined that the language of
8
Title VII, which prohibits "discrimination... because of... sex,"
provides equal protection to men as well as women. 9 In so holding,
the court applied the Supreme Court's previous decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'0 stating that Title VII bars discrimination
on the basis of sex stereotypes.' 1 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
referred to the Supreme Court's holding in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.12 that same-sex discrimination by an
individual, male or female, constitutes discrimination on the basis
of sex.' 3 The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Nichols led to a holding
4
analogous to the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse:'
Title VII bars discrimination against a man for his effeminacy, on
the ground that discrimination "because of . . . sex" in Title VII
includes discrimination because one does not fulfill stereotyped
expectations of masculinity. 15 The holding in Nichols reflects
society's growing recognition that gender roles cannot be separated
into the traditional, monolithic male/female dichotomy, where
males must manifest only masculine characteristics and females
must manifest only feminine characteristics. 16 Such a dichotomy
17
severely limits the purview and potency of Title VII protection.
Instead, the holding in Nichols allows for a wide array of variation
infra notes 66-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of
gender. In considering the holding in Nichols, one must bear in mind the
distinction between Nichols and Price Waterhouse. Price Waterhouse barred
discrimination because of sex, defining sex as gender stereotype and explaining
that an employer cannot discriminate against an individual for not comporting with
his or her particular gender stereotype. See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying
text. Nichols further applies the gender stereotype rationale by protecting the
individual who not only does not fulfill their own gender stereotype, as in Price
Waterhouse, but fulfills the gender stereotype of the opposite sex, completely
toppling the convention of the gender monolith. See infra notes 74, 148-151 and
accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
9. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2000)).
10. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
11. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228).
12. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
13. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872.
14. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that Title VII bars
discrimination against a woman for exhibiting masculine, instead of feminine,
behavior in the workplace, on the grounds that "because of ... sex" in Title VII
includes discrimination because one does not fulfill stereotyped expectations of
femininity).
15. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875.
16. See infra notes 92-101, 154-162 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
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between these traditional extremes, duly expanding Title VII
protection and allowing individuals more freedom in their gender
expression.
This Comment will detail the case law that led up to the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Nichols and will explore the possible
further interpretations of Title VII with regard to same-sex
harassment claims in the hostile work environment setting. Part
II will trace the development of the hostile work environment
doctrine as it applies to same-sex sexual harassment, examining
contrasting holdings that construe the term "sex" as referring to
either the nature of an action or as gender identification.' 8 Part
III will briefly describe Nichols and examine the rationale behind
the Ninth Circuit's holding.' 9 Part IV will then analyze the basis
for the court's rationale, note trends in case law, trace the
development of these trends, relate this development to the court's
holding, and posit where this development may lead. 20 Currently,
the
Title
VII
protects
whether
it
is
questionable
Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Transgendered (GLBT) community from
Part IV will
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 2'
illustrate how the Ninth Circuit's holding in Nichols has cleared a
path for offering Title VII protection to members of the GLBT
community by dictating the logical progression of defining "sex" to
22
also include "sexual orientation."
II. The Evolution of Title VII Jurisprudence
A. The Early Cases InterpretingTitle VII: Life Before the
Three Bears
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
18. In the evolution of the jurisprudential definition of "sex," the courts began
with a conception of sex as related to acts or behavior. See infra Part II.B.1. From
this development, "sex" became conceptualized as gender, a term related more to
See infra notes 68-114 and
biology and identity than to physical acts.
accompanying text. Rather than the previous emphasis on action, "sex" as gender
emphasizes the person's status and individuality in place of more tangible acts. See
infra notes 66-119 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 124-151 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 152-226 and accompanying text.
21. It should be noted that the legal analysis for transgendered individuals is
often quite different from that for homosexual or bisexual individuals. While this
Comment addresses homosexuality and bisexuality directly, the analysis can be
logically extended to the transgendered community because it develops from gender
identity and its relation to gender stereotypes.
22. See infra notes 152-226 and accompanying text.
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discrimination and harassment on the basis of race, sex, religion,
or national origin. 23 Since the inception of Title VII in 1964, all
levels of the federal court system have spent considerable time and
effort trying to ascertain the true meaning of the term "sex" as it
applies to the statute. 24 Federal courts have defined "sex" in the
context of the phrase "because of ... sex," only to redefine, extend,
25
and expand the definition of this term numerous times.
Decided in 1971, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 26 is one of

the first cases in which the courts examined sexual harassment
within the purview of Title VII.27 The Seventh Circuit determined
that Title VII was intended to remedy any disparate treatment,
whether directed at men or women, that resulted from stereotypes
of either sex. 28 With this holding, the court gave a fairly broad
reach to the prohibitions contained in Title VII.29 After Sprogis,
courts could exercise greater discretion in application of Title VII
30
to claims of sex discrimination.

23. Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII states, in
part, that "it shall be... unlawful ... for an employer... to... discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual's ... sex." Id. at § 2000e-

2(a)(1). Title VII does not refer specifically to sexual harassment, but instead to
discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. The cause of action for sexual harassment
has grown out of this prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. See Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998). Title VII also prohibits
retaliation against an employee who opposes illegal harassment or discrimination
in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256
F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. See infra notes 25-119 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971) (holding that "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes"); L.A. Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1978) (holding that an employment
practice cannot be predicated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the
characteristics of males or females); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983) (holding that men, as well as women, are protected
from sex discrimination under Title VII); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64-65 (1986) (finding that hostile work environment sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination actionable under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (finding that an employer who has acted on the basis of
sexual stereotypes has discriminated on the basis of gender); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82
(stating that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII).
26. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1198.
29. See id; supranote 25 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chic., 604 F.2d 1028,
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a written dress code that greatly differs for
female employees, causing them greater personal expense than male employees,
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In 1978, the Fifth Circuit held in Smith v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. 31 that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 32 The true issue in Smith was
whether the employer refused to hire Smith because the employer
believed Smith to be too "effeminate," not whether the plaintiff
33
suffered discrimination because of his sexual orientation.
Perhaps a bit too eager to address the taboo subject of
homosexuality, the Fifth Circuit made the Smith holding broader
34
than was necessary.
35
In its 1979 DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.
decision, the Ninth Circuit followed the example of the Fifth
Circuit, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation.3 6 The court further held that the
term "sex" should not be judicially extended to include "sexual
preference such as homosexuality." 37 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
held that the term "sex" should be defined as "gender," 38 a view
that turns the substance of the definition away from acts
committed by the harasser and points it toward characteristics of
the harassed. 39 The DeSantis decision illustrates the complex
process through which Title VII protection on the basis of sex has

violates Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th
Cir. 1975) (imposing an "equal protection gloss" when interpreting Title VII);
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251-53 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing
for recovery of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff suing under Title VII);
Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding
different compulsory retirement ages for male and female employees to be
discriminatory under Title VII).
31. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. See id. at 326.
33. Id. at 327. The court did recognize that the effeminacy of the plaintiff was
also an issue to be addressed. The court stated, "Here the claim is not that Smith
was discriminated against because he was a male, but because as a male, he was
thought to have those attributes more generally characteristic of females and
epitomized in the descriptive 'effeminate."' Id.
34. See id. at 326. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on the overly
broad rationale of the lower court, stating, "In considering this claim, the District
Court held that the Civil Rights Act does not forbid discrimination based on
affectional or sexual preference." Id. The Fifth Circuit also cited the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as an authority. See id. at 327 n. 1
('The EEOC itself has ruled that adverse action against homosexuals is not
cognizable under Title VII.") (citing EEOC Dec. No. 76-75 (1976), Emp. Prac. Guide
(CCH) 1 6495, at 4266; EEOC Dec. No. 76-67 (1975) (unpublished)).
35. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
36. See id. at 329-30.
37. Id. at 330.
38. Id. at 329-30.
39. See infra notes 68-119 and accompanying text.
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evolved.
B. The Courts Struggle to Define "Sex"
Decisions such as DeSantis created confusion in the courts
about the meaning of "sex" in Title VII. This confusion led to a
between
vacillated
string of inconsistent cases in which the courts
41
40
defining sex as either acts and behaviors, or as gender.
1. Somebody's Been Sleeping in My Bed! Sex Defined as
Acts or Behavior
In its 1986 decision Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 42 the
Supreme Court very strongly implied that in the context of sex
discrimination, the term "sex" refers to physical acts committed by
the perpetrator of the discrimination, 43 specifically "[ulnwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature." 44 Here, the Court chose to
focus on sexual conduct, avoiding consideration of the implications
of defining "sex" as gender. 45 The Court also cited the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines
interpreting Title VII, which refer to "sexual misconduct" as
constituting sexual harassment. 46 By focusing on conduct instead

40. See infra Part II.B.1.
41. See infra notes 66-119 and accompanying text.
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
43. See id. at 65. The Court noted that the EEOC Guidelines define sexual
harassment by first describing "workplace conduct that may be actionable under
Title VI." Id. (emphasis added). The Vinson Court also held that there are two
types of sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII: "harassment that involves the
conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors [quid pro quo
harassment], and harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a
hostile or offensive working environment." Id. at 62. The Court explained the
EEOC's creation of hostile work environment claims: "the EEOC drew upon a
substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id. at 65.
44. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
45. See infra notes 68-119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
implications of defining sex as gender.
46. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that the EEOC Guidelines

prohibit both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual
harassment. See id. Specifically, the Court explained its rationale as follows:
Relevant to the charges at issue in this case, the Guidelines provide that
such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual harassment,"
whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic
quid pro quo, where "such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
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of adopting the Ninth Circuit's sex-as-gender definition as defined
in DeSantis,47 the court began a trend of examining discrimination
48
from the viewpoint of the harasser.
When the courts first began to recognize an action for samesex sexual harassment, many courts required that the perpetrator
be a homosexual or bisexual for an action to lie. 49 In its 1996
decision Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,50 the Fourth
Circuit became one of the first jurisdictions to deem same-sex
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII.51 However, in the
same sentence in which they found such harassment actionable,
the Wrightson court qualified its holding by stating that the
harassers must have a same-sex sexual orientation as well. 52 This
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
47. See DeSantis v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979); supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
48. See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-32. With the gender definition, greater
emphasis would likely be put on the viewpoint of the person being harassed by
examining the victim's comportment with the gender monolith, interpreted with
respect to biological gender, gender identity, or gender stereotype. See infra notes
68-119 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 (4th Cir. 1996). Homosexual and bisexual individuals may collectively be
referred to as "same-sex oriented." See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
50. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996). In Wrightson, a male employee brought an
action against his employer, alleging that his homosexual male supervisor and
other homosexual male employees subjected him, as a heterosexual male, to hostile
work environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. See id. at 139-41.
Harassment consisted of pressure to engage in homosexual sex and frequent verbal
descriptions of such acts. See id. In addition, the perpetrator touched Wrightson in
sexually provocative ways while inviting Wrightson to engage in homosexual sex.
See id.
51. See id. at 141. The court cited the relevant portion of Title VII, stating:
"Title VII provides in relevant part that, '[iut shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge ... or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ...sex ......
Id. at 141-42. The Fourth Circuit cited the gender-neutral designations of
"employers" and "individual" employees as signifying that the employers and
individual employees could be either male or female, thus proscribing
discrimination regardless of "sex or gender." Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Fourth Circuit determined that "[t]hrough its proscription of
'employer' discrimination against 'individual' employees, the statute obviously
places no gender limitation whatsoever on the perpetrator or the target of the
harassment." Id.
52. See id. at 141. ("Today, we ... hold that a claim under Title VII for samesex 'hostile work environment' harassment may lie where the perpetrator of the
sexual harassment is homosexual.") This holding strongly conflicts with the court's
rationale for allowing an action for hostile work environment same-sex sexual
harassment. The court first stated that "[ain employee is harassed or otherwise
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element was added to the traditional test used to prove a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim. 53 The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that while the general sentiment of the courts was
against allowing claims for same-sex sexual harassment, they
were compelled by the "plain language of Title VII" to recognize

discriminated against 'because of his or her sex if, 'but-for' the employee's sex, he
or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination." Id. at 142. The court
then explained:
As a matter both of textual interpretation and simple logic, an employer of
either sex can discriminate against his or her employees of the same sex
because of their sex, just as he or she may discriminate against employees
of the opposite sex because of their sex. That is, a male employer who
discriminates only against his male employees and not against his female
employees, and a female employer who discriminates against her female
employees and not against her male employees, may be discriminating
against his or her employees "because of' the employees' sex, no less so
than may be the employer (male or female) who discriminates only against
his or her employees of the opposite sex. In all four instances, it is possible
that the employees would not have been victims of the employer's
discrimination were it not for their sex. There is, in other words, simply
no "logical connection" between Title VII's requirement that the
discrimination be "because of' the employee's sex and a requirement that a
harasser and victim be of different sexes.
Id. From the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the logical conclusion is that the employer's
or the harasser's sexual orientation is equally as irrelevant as gender, due to the
court's inability to provide a "logical connection."
In addition, the Fourth Circuit recognized that while the EEOC has a long
history of interpreting Title VII, the EEOC interpretation is not binding upon the
courts. See id. at 143. The court noted that:
The EEOC Compliance Manual specifically states: "The victim does not
have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser ...[Tlhe crucial inquiry is
whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently
from members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the
same sex where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the
victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual preference) and the harasser does
not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way."
Id. (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987)).
The parenthetical phrase "not on the victim's sexual preference" may be
interpreted as stating that the sexual orientation of the harasser is irrelevant. It
could also be read as stating the converse: that Title VII does not provide a cause
of action for discrimination based on the sexual orientation of the victim. While the
Fourth Circuit did not specifically choose the latter interpretation, it also declined
to specifically adopt the former. See id. at 143-44.
53. See id. at 142. The Fourth Circuit cited a previous articulation of the
traditional test, stating:
In order to prevail on a "hostile work environment" sexual harassment
claim, an employee must prove: (1) that he was harassed "because of' his
"sex"; (2) that the harassment was unwelcome; (3) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working
environment; and (4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the
employer.
Id. (citing McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195).
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the cause of action. 54
In its 1997 decision Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 55 the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed a same-sex
hostile work environment claim where the harasser was
heterosexual. 56 The defendant argued that as a heterosexual man,
he technically could not have sexually harassed an employee of the
same sex. 57 The Massachusetts court held that this argument was
incorrect, stating that "sexual harassment.., is not limited ... to

same sex conduct only where the harasser is a homosexual."5 The
Melnychenko court cited numerous federal court decisions that
conflicted with the defendant's theory. 59 These decisions led to the
demise of the requirement that the perpetrator of same-sex sexual
harassment in hostile work environment claims be homosexual or
bisexual.
In 1998, the Supreme Court irrefutably answered the
question of whether the perpetrator of same-sex sexual
harassment has to be homosexual or bisexual for a claim to be
actionable under Title VII. In Oncale u. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.60 the Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is

54. Id. at 144.
The Fourth Circuit stated that "where Congress has
unmistakably provided a cause of action, as it has through the plain language of
Title VII, we are without authority in the guise of interpretation to deny that such
exists, whatever the practical consequences." Id.

55. 676 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. 1997).
56. See id. at 46 n.4. While the harasser in this case was heterosexual, the
harassment involved simulated homosexual sex acts. See id.
57. See id. at 47. While the action was brought under Massachusetts law, the
defendant relied heavily on Title VII case law to support his argument. See id. In
addition, the court considered Title VII case law in its opinion. See id.
58. Id. at 48.
59. See id. at 48 n.5 (citing Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII
without regard to the sexual orientation of the harasser); Morgan v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir. 1990) (assuming male employee had cause of
action under Title VII for sexual harassment by heterosexual male coworker);
Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, 919 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding
that "same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII" as a
matter of law, and furthermore that "the sexual preference of the harasser is
irrelevant to a Title VII claim"); Nogueras v. Univ. of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 63
(D.P.R. 1995) (holding that, where a female employee alleged she was harassed by
female supervisor and co-worker, "same-sex harassment is an unlawful
employment practice" under Title VII and the "[d]efendant's gender is irrelevant");
Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(reviewing decisions of other federal courts and "assuming, without deciding, that
Title VII does apply to sexual harassment of a [presumably heterosexual] male by
his male co-workers")).
60. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). In Oncale, a male employee brought a Title VII action
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prohibited by Title V1161 and that the statute does not require the
62
perpetrator to be a homosexual or bisexual for an action to lie.
While the Court acknowledged that this was a departure from
previous holdings of lower courts, 63 the Court justified this
departure by relying on the pure text of the statute. 64 By not
against his former employer, male supervisors, and male co-workers, alleging
hostile work environment sexual harassment. See id. at 76. The plaintiff worked
as a roustabout on an all-male oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. See id. at 77. He
was subjected to humiliating sex-related actions and verbal abuse on several
occasions, including physical sexual assault and threats of rape. See id.
61. See id. at 79. Justice Scalia was emphatic in his statement of this holding:
"If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in
Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of. . . sex' merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on
behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. Justice Scalia first noted that many lower courts had held that for a
same-sex sexual harassment action to lie, the harasser must be same-sex oriented.
See id. ('Other decisions say that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff
can prove that the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by
sexual desire)."); see, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d
1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding a cause of action could exist for same-sex sexual
harassment only where the harasser is a homosexual); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a cause of action could exist for samesex sexual harassment where the harasser is a homosexual).
Scalia then proceeded with the Court's rationale for overruling the decisions of
the lower courts. After the initial statement that harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire, Scalia stated that "[a] trier of fact might reasonably
find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sexspecific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The Court tempered its ruling by determining
that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must
always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations, but actually constituted 'discriniinat[ioa]...because of... sex."' Id.
at 81. It should be noted that Scalia refers to the "conduct at issue," relating this
holding to the Court's notion in this decision that "sex" in the context of Title VII
refers to acts or behavior. Id. This bright line is blurred slightly by the Court's
statement that "[tihe real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which
are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed." Id. at 81-82.
64. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. As part of its textualist discussion, the Court
stated:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual
of Title VII.
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress
was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits
'discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions' of
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requiring the harasser to be homosexual or bisexual, the Court
shifted its examination of harassment claims from the viewpoint of
65
the harasser to the viewpoint of the victim.
2.

Sex Defined as Gender: The Story of Lady Bear and Her
Friends

Throughout the history of Title VII litigation, courts have
struggled to define "sex" within the context of the Act.66 With its
previous focus on conduct, the courts had been following a trend of
67
examining discrimination from the viewpoint of the harasser.
When courts have chosen not to focus on conduct as the
determinant in sexual harassment claims, they have treated the
term "sex" as referring to gender, holding that Title VII addresses
gender discrimination. 68 In Schwenk v. Hartford,69 the Ninth
Circuit noted the conflict between the differing approaches to the
70
definition of "sex" as gender.
After much deliberation, the courts have finally settled into
the pattern of defining "sex" as gender. 71 The adoption of the
employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must
extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements.
Id. at 79-80.
65. See infra notes 89-119 and accompanying text.
66. See supra Part II.A-II.B.1; infra notes 68-119 and accompanying text.
67. See supra Part II.A-II.B.1; infra notes 68-119 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Fifth Circuit held that "[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has
sexual overtones.
Title VII addresses gender discrimination." Id. (citations
omitted).
69. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
70. See id. at 1201. The Schwenk court considered the terms "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably, noting that some courts consider "sex" to mean "an individual's
distinguishing biological or anatomical characteristics" and consider "gender" to
mean "an individual's sexual identity" or refer to "socially-constructed
characteristics." Id. (citing Dobre v. Amtrak, 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984)).
71. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text. The Court was also
operating under this definition of "sex" when it allowed for the inclusion of men in
the protections of Title VII. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682-83 (1983). In this decision, the Court stated:
Male as well as female employees are protected against discrimination.
Thus, if a private employer were to provide complete health insurance
coverage for the dependents of its female employees, and no coverage at all
for the dependents of its male employees, it would violate Title VII. Such a
practice would not pass the simple test of Title VII discrimination that we
enunciated in Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 711 (1978), for it would treat a male employee with dependents "in a
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gender-based definition shifts the emphasis from the conduct of
the harasser to the viewpoint of the person harassed by examining
the victim's conformity to the traditional gender monolith, as
interpreted with respect to biological gender, gender identity, or
gender stereotype. 72 Therefore, in order to accurately consider the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Nichols, one must examine what this
holding means when gender is defined in terms of biology,
identity, or stereotype, and how this analysis affects the reach of
Title VII as defined in Nichols.
a.

Sex Defined as Biological Gender

Beginning with the earliest opinions interpreting Title VII,
courts have referred to biological gender-whether an individual is
anatomically male or female-as the touchstone for interpreting
the term "sex."73 The biological gender approach originates in both
the courts' and society's historical conception of gender as a
dichotomy based on two opposing, internally monolithic
categories.7 4 The Supreme Court has used this approach in Title
VII sex discrimination cases when it finds a general hostility to
the presence of one sex in the workplace, a hostility that may be
motivated by either hatred or desire. 75 Proof of hostility based on
desire can be found relatively easily. One merely has to prove
that, but for the gender of the victim, the victim would not be
attractive to the harasser and would not be subject to unwelcome
sexual advances of the harasser. 76 Hostility based on hatred, such

manner which but for that person's sex would be different.
Id. (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711). Prior to Oncale, however, sex as gender
had also been held to deny protection for same-sex sexual harassment claims in
some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (stating that because Title
VII specifically addresses gender discrimination, harassment by a male supervisor
against a male subordinate does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
even though the harassment has sexual overtones).
72. See infra notes 73-119 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
74. See Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other
Forms of Heterosexual "HorsePlay": Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace
Gender Hierarchies,and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale,
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 210-11 (1999). These dichotomous categories, male
and female, are said to be monolithic in that the characteristics of each sex are
supposedly consistent throughout that sex and unique to that sex. See id.
75. See id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81
(1998)).
76. See Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex
Hostile-EnvironmentSexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 10 (1999).
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as that present in Oncale,7 7 is much more difficult to prove.
Unfortunately, in a case of same-sex sexual harassment where the
harasser is heterosexual, hostility based on hatred is the only
method by which one can prove a Title VII claim if "sex" is defined
as biological gender. 78 The absence of a convenient bright-line
test, as established in Part II of this article, creates difficulty in
interpretation of the harasser's motivation. 79 The best test as to
motivation in such a case is a more general inquiry into whether
the harasser would have harassed a victim of the opposite
biological gender. 80 If not, then the presence of gender-related
motivation has the same legitimacy and relevance as it would in a
8
situation of opposite-sex sexual harassment. '
As early as 1979, the Ninth Circuit in DeSantis was among
the first courts to hold that "sex" refers only to biological gender,
not to conduct.8 2 The Ninth Circuit cited its holding as comporting
with "traditional notions of 'sex."' 83 The court also stated that
legislative history dictates that these notions could not be
judicially extended to prohibit discrimination based on "sexual
preference," emphasizing the court's staunch reliance on the
biological definition of gender. 84 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the purpose behind the legislation was to ensure equal
treatment between men and women, again emphasizing the
85
biological gender definition of "sex."
While finding against the employee claiming discrimination,
DeSantis was nonetheless a step forward because it defined "sex"
as gender. Defining "sex" as gender is progressive because it puts
the emphasis on the viewpoint of the victim. Unfortunately, it was

77. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
79. See supranotes 60-64 and accompanying text.
80. See DelPo, supra note 76, at 24.
81. See id.
82. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. In DeSantis, male and
female homosexuals brought civil rights actions claiming that their employers or
former employers made discriminatory employment decisions because of their
homosexuality. See DeSantis v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 328
(9th Cir. 1979). The court held that Title VII's prohibition of "sex" discrimination
applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be judicially
extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality. See id. at 329-30.
83. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329.
84. Id. The court noted that while several bills had been introduced to amend
the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "sexual preference,"
none of the bills had been passed. See id.
85. See id.
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years before this progressive definition of "sex" was adopted by
other courts.
Years later, in 1996, the Fourth Circuit in Wrightson focused
its analysis on the conduct aspect of "sex,"8 6 while also
aspects of the "biological gender" definition of
incorporating
"sex."8 7 The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the biological gender of
the parties in Wrightson demonstrates how, even when
approaching "sex" through a conduct-based analysis, the courts
considered the interplay of biological gender differences in
deciding Title VII cases. 88
b.

Sex Defined as Gender Identity

The Ninth Circuit has also addressed "sex" as referring to
both "biological differences between men and women-and
gender."8 9 In its 2000 decision Schwenk, the court addressed the
issue of defining "sex" as the gender with which the plaintiff
identifies, regardless of whether it comports with the plaintiffs
biological gender.9 0 The court examined the sex-gender definition
as determined by several courts, concluding that the term "sex" in
Title VII can be construed to include gender identity. 9 '

86. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
87. The Fourth Circuit was very conscious of clarifying that all gender-neutral
terminology in Title VII referred to both males and females:
Title VII broadly prohibits "employers" (whether male or female) from
discriminating against "individual" employees (whether they be male or
Through its
female) on the basis of the latter's "sex," or gender.
proscription of "employer" discrimination against "individual" employees,
the statute obviously places no gender limitation whatsoever on the
perpetrator or the target of the harassment.
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996).
88. See id.
89. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
past Title VII decisions lead to the conclusion that "sex" refers to both biological
and gender identity).
90. See id. at 1201-02. Plaintiff was a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual
prisoner who sued a state prison guard and prison officials alleging attempted rape
by the prison guard. See id. at 1192. The court held that Title VII encompasses sex
and gender and therefore non-conformance to the perception of one's gender as
well. See id. at 1201-02.
91. See id. In its examination, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[iun the context of
Title VII, federal courts ...initially adopted the approach that sex is distinct from
gender, and, as a result, held that Title VII barred discrimination based on the
former but not the latter." Id. (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d
659, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1977)). Schwenk explained that Holloway "refus[ed] to extend
protection of Title VII to transsexuals because discrimination against transsexuals
is on basis of 'gender' rather than 'sex."' Id. The court then compared its prior
holding in Holloway to those of other jurisdictions. See id.
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It is not unusual for a man to exhibit characteristics thought
of as "feminine."9 2 One can easily cite several motives for crossing
gender boundaries in this manner. 93 One prominent motive is that
there are aspects of the female gender monolith that a man may
identify with more than those of his own biological sex. 94 These
characteristics may vary in obviousness from graceful,
exaggerated hand gestures to more subtle qualities, such as
shyness or passivity. 95 In some cases, mere politeness has been
considered crossing gender boundaries. 96 In cases such as this,
harassers may even question the individual's sex, demonstrating
their disdain for persons who have a gender identity that does not
fully comport with the male gender monolith. 97 The converse is
equally true for women, creating targets out of members of both
genders who fail to conform to prescribed gender roles due to their
98
more individualized gender identity.
Sexual harassment based on gender identity is rooted in the
paradigms of masculine sexual aggression and domination, and
feminine passivity and submission, where the harasser feels the
need to exercise his power over the victim in "sex-based terms." 99
This paradigm allows the harasser to subordinate his victim as a
passive sexual object regardless of biological sex-the harasser
relies on the victim's gender identity to perpetuate a workplace
hierarchy favoring the harasser. 100 However, this must not be

92. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 74, at 236-39.
93. See id. at 236.
The difference between gender identity and gender
94. See id. at 238.
stereotype can be clarified by examining motive: gender identity originates within
the individual whose behavior is being scrutinized. Gender stereotype originates in
the external perception of the scrutinizing party. See id. at 236.
95. See id. at 237.
96. See, e.g., One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 235 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. 1967).
97. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
98. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 74, at 195.
99. Id. at 198.
100. See id. at 199. Axam and Zalesne continue this thought, stating that such
hierarchies "equate masculinity with power and femininity with powerlessness and
[therefore] consign less masculine individuals to positions of inferiority." Id. The
authors also point out that:
Regardless of whether these sexual humiliations and invasions are
directed at women or at men whose projected gender identity is perceived
as less masculine than the harasser's, these forms of sexual domination
vividly evoke the harasser's uniquely male biological capacity to penetrate
and dominate sexually. Thus, these forms of harassment become a
powerful means by which dominant, masculine males communicate their
superior position in terms of a gender-based hierarchy, perpetuate the
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construed as a legitimate hierarchical workplace dynamic. Such a
constant, focused barrage of verbal or physical abuse becomes a
significant, defining aspect of the victim's work life, adversely
affecting his or her ability to perform and contribute to
productivity, hampering collegial relationships, and frequently
causing him or her to leave that work situation. 101
By adopting the gender identity definition, the Ninth Circuit
strongly reinforces its shift from an emphasis on the viewpoint of
the harasser to an emphasis on the viewpoint of the victim. 02 The
Ninth Circuit concluded in Schwenk that "sex" cannot be defined
by applying external gender stereotypes and declined to issue a
narrow ruling that would refuse protection for those who do not
10 3
meet their "socially-prescribed gender expectations."'
c.

Sex Defined as Externally Imposed Gender Stereotypes

The most recent decisions in the area of same-sex sexual
harassment have held that discrimination "because of . . . sex"
prohibits harassment on the basis of non-conformity to externallyimposed gender stereotypes. 0 4 These gender stereotypes play a
significant role in sexual discrimination encountered in the
workplace. 10 5 They are used to degrade and demean members of
the workforce who do not comport with societal gender
expectations at large, despite the fact that non-fulfillment of a
gender stereotype rarely has an impact on one's ability to perform

masculinized image of power, and marginalize and subordinate women
and men who occupy lower strata on the gender-driven hierarchy of power
and privilege in the workplace.

Id.
101. See id. at 204.
102. See supra notes 89-9 1.
103. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 n.12 (9th Cir. 2000). In making
its decision, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that:
What matters ... is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination
is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator's
actions stem from the fact that he believed that the victim was a man who
"failed to act like" one. Thus, under Price Waterhouse, "sex" under Title
VII encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences between men
and women--and gender. Discrimination because one fails to act in the
way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII....
However, [Title VII and the Gender Motivated Violence Act] prohibit
discrimination based on gender as well as sex. Indeed, for purposes of
these two acts, the terms "sex" and "gender' have become interchangeable.
Id. at 1202.
104. See infra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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in the workplace. 0 6 Ironically, the harassment that springs from
gender stereotypes can significantly interfere with the victim's
l0 7
career progress.
When defining "sex" as gender stereotypes, it is important to
note how a man may process his perceptions in relation to his
position within the workplace hierarchy. As one author opines,
"[s]eeing a feminine man evokes a tremendous amount of anxiety
in many men; it triggers an awareness of their own feminine
qualities, such as passivity or sensitivity, which they see as being
a sign of weakness."'10 8 As a result, the male harasser re-evaluates
his position within the hierarchy with a newfound awareness of
his feminine traits, which in his mind lower his hierarchical
worth. 109 He may then determine to distract from his newlyperceived personal weaknesses by drawing attention to these
exaggerated traits in his co-worker, thereby demonstrating how
110
the co-worker does not fulfill the gender stereotype.
In 1978, the Supreme Court first recognized the proposition
that discrimination based on gender stereotypes is prohibited,
stating that, "employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere
'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or
females.""' In 1989, the Court expanded this statement in Price
Waterhouse v.Hopkins,112 stating that employers who act on the
106. See DelPo, supra note 76, at 23.
107. See id.
108. Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual
Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination,5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
105, 106 (1995).
109. See id. at 105-06.
110. The consequences of this same-sex gender stereotype dynamic can be aptly
demonstrated within the opposite-sex paradigm. As Axam and Zalesne explain:
One recurring pattern in both opposite-sex and same-sex harassment cases
is the derision of stereotypically feminine traits and the marginalization of
individuals who possess such traits. This form of harassment invokes
gender stereotypes that view stereotypically masculine traits as hallmarks
of a competent, successful worker and depict stereotypically feminine
traits as more appropriate to other, traditionally female roles centered
around domesticity, sexuality, and reproduction.
Axam & Zalesne, supra note 74, at 192-93. Women, not fearing their own
femininity, are not prone to anxiety over any perceived weakness in the workplace
hierarchy that could be stimulated by seeing a feminine man. See Craig, supra
note 108, at 106.
111. L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
112. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, Hopkins, a female employee,
brought a Title VII action against her employer, an accounting firm, after the firm
refused to make her a partner. See id.at 228. Criticisms of her business abilities
were based on her lack of femininity and general aggressive demeanor deemed not
befitting a female partner. See id. at 234-35. Evaluators suggested Hopkins wear
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113
basis of sex stereotypes are acting on the basis of gender.
Following Price Waterhouse, any employment action made on the
4
basis of gender is proscribed by Title VII."
In 2001, the Third Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent
from Price Waterhouse, stating in Bibby v. PhiladelphiaCoca Cola
Bottling Co.115 that a cause of action under Title VII exists for
same-sex sexual harassment when the harassment is directed at
the victim's non-conformity to gender stereotypes.11 6 The Third
Circuit named such harassment as one of three ways in which a
plaintiff may allege same-sex sexual harassment." 7 The court
then continued to state that other ways to allege same-sex sexual
harassment, such as harassment based on sexual orientation, may

makeup and jewelry, style her hair in a more feminine manner, and take a course
at "charm school" to improve her chances at making partner the next time she was
evaluated. Id. at 235. In contrast, her actual work product for Price Waterhouse
was deemed impressive. See id. at 234.
113. See id. at 250. Specifically, the Court stated that "[i]n the specific context of
sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot
be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." Id.
114. The Court made this determination after a strict textualist reading of Title
VII. See id. at 239. It stated:
In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous
announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to
Congress' intent
the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees ....
to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment
In now-familiar language,
decisions appears on the face of the statute ....
the statute forbids an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an
individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or to "limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's ... sex".... We take these words to mean that gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions.
Id. at 239-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2) (1978)).
115. 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001). In Bibby, a male homosexual employee
brought an action against his employer, "alleging hostile work environment sexual
harassment under Title VII." Id. at 257. Having taken time off from his job at
Philadelphia Coca-Cola for medical reasons, Bibby returned to endure physical and
verbal threats and abuse from a co-worker, aimed at his sexual orientation. See id.
at 259. Bathroom graffiti of the same nature appeared throughout the factory. See
id. at 260. Bibby also returned to increased job-related harassment and criticism
by supervisors, which he alleged to be unwarranted. See id.
116. See id. at 263.
117. See id. at 264. The court held discrimination may be because of sex if: (1)
the harasser is "motivated by sexual desire;" (2) the harasser is expressing "general
hostility to the presence of one sex in the workplace;" or (3) the harasser is acting
"to punish the victim's noncompliance with gender stereotypes." Id. (citing Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 20:237

be determined in the future. 11 However, the court declined to
make such a jurisprudential leap, as the matter was not properly
before it.119
In considering the decisions discussed thus far, it is apparent
that the courts have slowly moved towards expanding Title VII
protections "because of sex."'120
Some courts have explicitly
expressed their distaste for any discrimination based on sexual
orientation.' 2'
Other courts have intimated that they would
consider extending Title VII protections to sexual orientation,
given the proper circumstances. 1 22 However, the courts will not
make this extension until the definition of "sex" as gender
stereotype is broadened. "Sex" as gender stereotype must include
individuals who not only fail to comport with the monolithic
conception of their biological gender, but also individuals who
comport with the monolithic conception of the opposite gender.
123
Nichols has accomplished the necessary broadening.
III. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises: Little Bear
Enters the Picture
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises represents a
considerable leap forward in the jurisprudence underlying samesex sexual harassment. From its inception in 1964, until the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Price Waterhouse, this sexas-gender-stereotypes doctrine has developed with great caution
and trepidation, lest too many protections be imputed to Title VII
and its potency be diluted. 124 Both Price Waterhouse and Oncale
have accelerated this development with the sweeping breadth of
their holdings, a breadth that has yet to be limited. Price
Waterhouse held that if an employer acts out of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive because that behavior takes her out
of the confines of femininity, that employer has discriminated on

118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See supra notes 23-119 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 206208 and accompanying text (noting why courts might be willing to extend Title VII
protections to sexual orientation).
123. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
124. See supra notes 23-119 and accompanying text.
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the basis of gender. 125 Oncale held that a cause of action under
Title VII is not barred merely because the harasser and the victim
are of the same sex. 126 Taking its cue from these decisions, the
Ninth Circuit has used these two decisions as the firm foundation
to make another leap in the analysis of same-sex sexual
harassment claims.
Nichols was brought on appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, where the
court had entered judgment for the employer following a bench
trial. 127 In reversing this decision in favor of Sanchez, the Ninth
Circuit examined the facts of his claim. During his four-year
career as a restaurant host and a food server with Azteca
Restaurant Enterprises, Sanchez endured a continuous and
unrelenting course of verbal abuse aimed at his effeminate
bearing, ranging from insults and name-calling to extreme
vulgarities. 128 Both his co-workers and a supervisor "repeatedly
referred to [him] in Spanish and English as 'she' and 'her,' in
29
addition to calling him a "faggot" and a "fucking female whore."'
Sanchez was chided for having feminine
Additionally,
mannerisms, exemplified by an incident when he was berated for
"carrying his [serving] tray 'like a woman."' 130 Furthermore, he
was harassed for not having sexual intercourse with a female
friend who was also a server at the restaurant. 131 The Ninth
Circuit determined that these abuses occurred from once a week to
132
several times a day.
After stating that sexual harassment that creates a hostile
work environment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII,
the Ninth Circuit applied the test for hostile work environment
sexual harassment, as set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton. 133 Proceeding under this analysis, the court examined
125. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
126. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
127. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 864.
128. See id. at 870.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 874.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 870.
133. 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). Prior to Faragher,the Ninth Circuit examined
hostile work environment complaints by considering: (1) whether the victim was
subjected to harassing verbal or physical conduct; (2) whether the conduct was
unwelcome; and (3) whether the conduct altered the conditions of the victim's
employment and created an abusive working environment. Nichols, 256 F.3d at
872 n.4 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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whether the workplace was "both objectively and subjectively
offensive."'134 Drawing on the Supreme Court's ruling in Oncale,
the Ninth Circuit stated that Sanchez would also have to prove
135
that the harassment was "because of sex."'
In considering whether the environment was objectively
hostile, the court examined the frequency and severity of the
conduct, whether the conduct was physically threatening, whether
the conduct was humiliating, and whether the conduct interfered
Having reviewed the
with Sanchez's work performance. 3 6
testimony of the parties, the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to the
district court, that the verbal abuse suffered by Sanchez
137
undeniably created an objectively hostile work environment.
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district court with
138
respect to the "subjectively hostile" prong of the Faraghertest.
Although Sanchez may not have exhausted all of the proper
remedial channels directly provided by Azteca, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that he did complain about the sexual harassment to
supervisors on several occasions. 39 The district court found that
the environment was not subjectively hostile because not all of
Sanchez's interactions with his harassers were hostile. 140 The
Ninth Circuit scrutinized the district court's flawed reasoning and
determined that, although not all the interactions had been
4
hostile, this did not mean that none of them were.' '
Finally, the Nichols court addressed whether the harassment
occurred because of Sanchez's sex. Jurisprudentially, this portion
of the opinion continues where the Supreme Court concluded in
Price Waterhouse. Sanchez asserted that he was verbally abused
because of his perceived effeminacy, an effeminacy which caused
him to fail to conform to his harassers' heterosexist male

134. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 871-72 (quoting Faragher,524 U.S. at 787). The court
stated that the Faragher"objectively and subjectively offensive" test required both
that a reasonable person would find the workplace hostile or abusive and that the
victim in fact perceived the workplace as such. Id.
135. Id. at 872 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
136. See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
137. See id. at 873.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 873. Azteca company policy requires that any incidents be
reported either to the Azteca EEO Officer at the corporate office or to the Area
Manager responsible for the restaurant where the incident occurred. See id. at 870.
140. See id. at 873.
141. See id.
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stereotype. 142 Sanchez further asserted that under this theory, his
harassment occurred because of sex and was therefore actionable
under Title VII. 14 3 Sanchez relied on the Price Waterhouse
decision, contending that it applies equally to a man who does not
fulfill societal stereotypes because he acts in a manner that is too
"feminine."'144 The Ninth Circuit cited dicta from Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.145 that commented on the applicability
of Price Waterhouse to a case of same-sex harassment of a man for
146
failing to "meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity."'
Applying this dicta, the court held that same-sex sexual
harassment based on failure to fulfill the male stereotype
Therefore, any
constitutes discrimination based on sex. 47
harassment of this nature is prohibited by Title VII because it is
discrimination based on sex.
In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit combined and developed the
holdings of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, holding that Title VII
allows a hostile work environment action when the victim is
subjected to verbal abuse for not fulfilling monolithic gender
stereotypes, regardless of his true sexual orientation and
regardless of whether the harassers are of the same or opposite
sex. 148 Nichols also furthers Price Waterhouse's proposition that
an employer cannot discriminate against an individual for failing
to comport with his or her gender stereotype. 49 Nichols extends
this by barring discrimination against an individual whose
behavior comports with the gender stereotype of the opposite sex,
whereas Price Waterhouse solely barred discrimination against an
individual whose behavior does not comport with the gender

142. See id. at 874.
143. See id.
144. See id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)). The
Ninth Circuit quoted from Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse
for the proposition that "[iln the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 250).
145. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
146. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 C'[J]ust as a woman can ground an action on a
claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped
expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of
masculinity." (quoting Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 n.4)).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 874-75.
149. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
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stereotype of his or her own sex.1 50 The Nichols decision takes the
viewpoint that gender definition originates with the individual
instead of with society, allowing the individual greater freedom to
behave as he or she feels is in his or her true nature. 151 Nichols
thus frees the individual from society's gender monolithic confines
by offering Title VII protection from hostile work environments
that can result from the exercise of this freedom.
IV. When Dude Can Look Like a Lady Under Title VII
The legal community has followed the course of Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises with intense scrutiny, while the
GLBT community has watched the development of Nichols with
hopes that the case will yield Title VII protection based on sexual
orientation. 152 Conservative jurists have declared the decision
inconsequential, adding nothing to extant case law that had not
been previously addressed in Price Waterhouse or Oncale. To the
chagrin of both of these divergent factions, the actual significance
of the Nichols holding lies somewhere between these extremes. To
understand the advance in Title VII jurisprudence yielded by
Nichols, one must first understand the meaning this holding
attributes to the definition of "sex," as well as how that meaning is
applied in Nichols. In addition, one must understand how that
meaning comports with the different views of the basis of sexual
orientation that are held by society at large and by the courts.
A. Nichols Analyzed Through "Sex" Defined as Gender
To determine if the gender monolithic doctrine of "sex" as
biological gender is applicable to Nichols, one must focus on
proving that the hostility towards Sanchez was based on hatred. 153
The court's opinion does not state that Sanchez's harassers were
same-sex oriented or that any of the harassment had a basis in
desire. 154 Indeed, the comments quoted in the record imply

150. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874.
151. See id. at 875.
152. See, e.g., Alan J. Jacobs, Ninth Circuit Rules Same-Sex Harassment Based
on Nonconformity Violates Title VII, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES, Sept. 2001, at 159;
Federal Court Rules Against Sex Stereotyping of Male Employees, GENDERPAC
NATIONAL NEWS, Aug. 27, 2001, at http://www.gpac.org/archive/news/index.html
(last visited Apr. 25, 2002).
153. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
154. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 870-75.
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nothing but hatred and derision for Sanchez. 155 Proceeding under
the biological gender analysis, one must ask whether the
harassers would object to the presence of a male server who
exhibited all of the typical male personality characteristics as
determined by the male gender monolith. The record does not
156
Next, one
imply that the harassers had any such objections.
must consider whether Sanchez exhibited all of the typical male
personality characteristics as determined by the male gender
monolith. The record implies that he did not. 157 In fact, the record
indicates that it was the disparity between Sanchez's mannerisms
and those of the male gender monolith that was the impetus for
the harassment. 158 Without evidence that the harassers were
discriminating against Sanchez because he was representative of a
biological gender toward which they felt animosity, a court
analyzing Nichols under the biological gender approach probably
would not find sex discrimination.
As demonstrated in the discussion of Oncale,159 analysis of a
same-sex sexual harassment claim under the biological gender
definition limits this cause of action to situations where the
harasser treats men and women differently based on this
This definition necessarily limits
dichotomous grouping.
application of Title VII sex discrimination protection to individuals
who do not identify with socially accepted perceptions of the
gender dichotomy, or to individuals who do not fulfill the
stereotype of acceptable behavior of either male or female.
60
As illustrated in the discussion of Schwenk, 1 "sex" has also
been defined by the Ninth Circuit as the individual's gender
identity: how the victim of harassment describes his or her selfconception of gender and how he or she relates to persons of
differing and like genders. 16 1 The importance of the genderidentification definition of "sex" becomes apparent when one
considers how the specific gender-defined aspects of one's
personality can be used to distinguish that individual from other
members of his or her biological sex. When merely considering
biological gender, the courts neglect an array of factors that help to

155. See id. at 870, 874.
156. See id. at 870-75.
157. See id.

158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 870, 874.
See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
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define the individual and place him or her in the proper societal
context to adequately and accurately consider a Title VII hostile
162
work environment claim.
By performing a cursory examination of the facts of Nichols,
one can readily apply the gender identity definition of "sex" to the
text of Title VII and arrive at the same result as the Ninth Circuit.
Sanchez was chastised for his feminine mannerisms in both his
walk and how he carried his tray.1 63
In addition, he was
constantly referred to with feminine pronouns. 64 The facts of
Nichols do not state that Sanchez was a more masculine
individual than claimed by his harassers.
It was, however,
implied that Sanchez's harassers used these insults and invectives
to subjugate him, elevating themselves in the workplace hierarchy
while debasing Sanchez for not identifying with a strict definition
of the masculine gender monolith. 165 As analyzed under the
gender identity definition of "sex," the Ninth Circuit would have
extended Title VII protection to Sanchez.
As evidenced by the Supreme Court's holding in Price
Waterhouse, the latest trend in Title VII jurisprudence is to
analyze sexual discrimination claims under a gender stereotype
definition of "sex." 166 Simply explained, if the harasser creates a
hostile work environment by insinuating through verbal or
physical abuse that the victim does not fulfill the harasser's
conception of a representative member of the victim's gender, then
the harasser has discriminated against the victim "because of...
sex." 167 The gender stereotype in question is that held by the
harasser, which is typically determined by the ubiquitous and
omnipresent gender monolith. 68 The key distinction between
gender stereotype and gender identity is whether it is the harasser
or the victim who is defining the victim's characteristics and
162. Quoting two prominent jurists, one author has stated that "[t]he term
'gender' is 'borrowed from grammar to designate the sexes viewed as social rather
than biological classes' and 'has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural
or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to
the sexes."' Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: A Call for ConductBased and Gender-Based Applications of Title VII, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 151,
168-69
(1992)
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

(1997) (quoting, respectively, RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 24
and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874.
See id. at 870.
See id. at 872-73.
See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
168. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 74, at 209.
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applying them to the gender monolith. 169 In choosing to analyze
Title VII under a gender stereotype definition of "sex," the Ninth
Circuit shifted its focus back toward the perceptions of the
harassers and how the harassers imposed their external gender
expectations on Sanchez, by forcing him to submit to further abuse
when he failed to meet these gender expectations.
In determining whether the harassment is based on "sex" as
defined by gender stereotype, it does not matter if the harasser
and the victim are of the same biological gender. 170 If the victim
faces ridicule because of his or her inability to fulfill a stereotype,
then it is the victim's gender, not that of the harasser, that is the
reason for the harassment, making the harassment truly "because
of ... sex."' 171 In such a case, the sexual nature of the claim will
hinge on the sexual nature of the harassment, which is not to be
confused with the sexual orientation of the victim. 172 When
considering "sex" as defined by gender stereotype, the focus of the
court will be on how the abuse of the harasser relates to the
victim's inability to conform to gender stereotypes as dictated by
17 3
the traditional gender monoliths.
In applying the gender stereotype definition of "sex" to the
facts of Nichols, the Ninth Circuit determined that Sanchez did
indeed suffer discrimination "because of ... sex" and was therefore
entitled to the protections available under Title VII. 74 Sanchez's
harassers were very clear about their feelings that he did not
fulfill their stereotype for a male server at the restaurant. 175 The
harassers would refer to Sanchez as "her" or "she" several times a
day. 176 Frequently they would carry this gender-bending abuse
farther, as when they referred to him as a "fucking female
whore."17 7 Sanchez additionally did not fulfill their masculine
stereotype when he declined to have sex with a female platonic
While observing his feminine
friend and co-worker. 178
mannerisms in the work environment, the harassers may have

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See

supra note 94.
DelPo, supra note 76, at 24.
id. at 23.
id.
id.
supra notes 124-147 and accompanying text.
Nichols, 256 F.3d at 870.
id.
id. at 874.
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seen similarities between their victim and themselves and wished
to mask those similarities by subjecting him to "a relentless
campaign of insults, name-calling, and vulgarities,"'179 180thereby
assuring their elevated status in the workplace hierarchy.
In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit clearly established that the
gender stereotype definition of "sex" is the appropriate definition
for the purpose of applying Title VII protections.' 8s The court
applied all of the traditional rules, tests, and holdings, ultimately
finding that there is no doubt that an effeminate man can claim
Title VII protections from harassers of the same sex who are
subjecting him to a hostile work environment because of his
effeminacy. 8 2 The court never addressed the sexual orientation of
the victim, most likely because the victim never alleged sexual
orientation discrimination.18 3 However, because of the content of
some of the harassers' epithets, the Ninth Circuit could have
broadened its holding to include sexual orientation in the
definition of gender stereotype. 84 Instead, the Ninth Circuit in
Nichols merely pointed us in that direction, preserving a more
sweeping declaration for a future case.
B. The Breadth of Title VII Protection Offered to the GLBT
Community Through Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises: What Happens to Big Bear?
If the nation's courts adopt the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Nichols as prevailing law in all jurisdictions, it does not
necessarily follow that courts would have to extend Title VII
protection to explicitly cover all instances of sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace. Upon consideration of several
hypothetical situations, it is evident that for Title VII to apply,
there must be some clear correlation between the victim's sexual
orientation and his or her conduct or behavior that does not
comport with the gender stereotype.
At one extreme of the correlative spectrum is the situation in
which the employee's sexual orientation has no connection to any
employment action taken. Here, a homosexual employee is not
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 870.
See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 873-75.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 870. The harassers in Nichols also called Sanchez a "faggot" on

several occasions. Id.
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entitled to Title VII protection if he or she is terminated because of
poor job performance, which is an evaluative factor unrelated to
his or her sexual orientation. In this situation, there is no nexus
between the negative employment action and the employee's
sexual orientation as it relates to "sex" defined as gender
stereotype. At the other extreme of the correlative spectrum
between conduct and behavior, a homosexual employee is
protected by Title VII if he or she is verbally or physically abused
in a manner directly relating to his or her inability to comport
with gender stereotypes. 185 This nexus between abuse and genderstereotype conformity has been judicially established in both
Nichols and Price Waterhouse.186
Between these two extremes lies a more nebulous area that
merits further exploration and conjecture. How far into the
differences inherent in same-sex sexual orientation does the
protection offered by the gender stereotype definition of "sex"
reach? Nichols established that the effeminate male employee will
be protected from abuse aimed at his behavior to the extent that
this behavior is contrary to his gender stereotype.1 87 It is therefore
logical that Title VII protection will be equally available to the
homosexual employee who suffers adverse employment treatment,
being told that he cannot do his job as effectively as a heterosexual
employee because his effeminacy renders him weak and lower in
the workplace hierarchy. There is an obvious nexus in this case
between the gender stereotype that stems from the homosexual
employee's sexual orientation and the resulting adverse
employment action suffered.
In contrast, under present Title VII jurisprudence, the Act's
protections do not extend to the homosexual job applicant who is
turned away, being told that the employer does not hire
homosexuals simply because he or she does not like homosexuals.
While this may be an admittedly unjust and dissatisfactory result,
there can be no nexus between a gender stereotype and behavior
when there is no behavior to which one can apply the stereotype.
In addition, the employer could also turn away a homosexual
applicant by saying that other employees or business associates

185. This extreme refers to the scenario of the effeminate man or the masculine
woman.
186. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250 (1989); see also supra notes 112-114 and 124-151 and accompanying text
(detailing the implications of Nichols and discussing Price Waterhouse).
187. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75.
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would be uncomfortable working with "immoral sodomites."
Again, while the result is upsetting, the discrimination is not
related to gender stereotypical behavior attributed to the
homosexual applicant and thus is not prohibited by Title VII. The
employer remains free to make judgments on the morality of the
applicant, so long as those judgments are not linked to a specific
behavior. In such a situation, the homosexual job applicant may
have an available remedy through state law, depending upon his
188
or her state of residence.
To compare, consider the scenario in which the employer
refuses to hire the homosexual applicant because the employer
believes that all homosexuals are promiscuous, whereas all
heterosexual applicants are virtuous, and the employer wants a
clean, moral workplace where the employees are not always
thinking about, discussing, and seeking sexual activities. In such
a situation, the employer has imputed a behavioral stereotype on
the homosexual employee. It is arguable that the employer has
not held the homosexual employee to a gender stereotype
inapposite to his behavior-instead, the homosexual's behavior is
simply assumed, causing his application to be immediately and
summarily discarded.
However, the reality of this situation is quite different. The
employer is operating under the gender stereotype that all male
employees are virtuous and morally suitable for employment, and
that their virtue and morality are connected to their comportment
with behavior dictated by the male gender monolith.
The
employer is also assuming that the homosexual .applicant is
promiscuous, basing this assumption on the applicant's inability to
fulfill the monolithic gender stereotype due to his sexual
orientation: because the homosexual is attracted to people of the
same sex, he or she does not fulfill the monolithic stereotype of
opposite-sex sexual attraction. Furthermore, the employer is
assuming that the homosexual applicant's failure to fulfill the
gender stereotype with regard to sexual orientation will cause him
to fail to fulfill the gender stereotype of a man as virtuous and
moral. It is this last assumption of the employer that provides the
homosexual with the necessary nexus between behavior and

188. See, e.g., Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.03 (2001).
The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the areas of employment, housing, public accommodation, public
services, education, or credit. See id.
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gender stereotype to receive Title VII protection. 18 9 The employer
in this scenario has constructed a gender stereotype that he or she
refuses to allow the applicant to fulfill, thus discriminating against
the homosexual "because of ...sex."' 190
By examining these hypothetical situations, one can further
understand the meaning of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Nichols.
Nichols has created greater protections for individuals not falling
within the traditional gender stereotypes prescribed by society.
However, these protections are not limitless. It is therefore
important that we examine the boundaries of this new guard
against discrimination.
C. And This One's Just Right... The Effects of Changing
Attitudes Towards Same-Sex Sexual Orientations
It is evident from their recent conflicting holdings that some
circuits are still battling the quandary of how to reconcile the
progressive developments of a more accepting society with presentbut-wavering conservative jurisprudential homophobia.191 Some of
the more enlightened circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, 192 have
refrained from taking the final step toward inclusion of same-sex
oriented individuals in Title VII protections because they have not
yet been forced to address this issue in light of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Price Waterhouse19 3 and Oncale.194 Prior to
these groundbreaking decisions, other circuits with less
progressive reputations had quickly determined that sexual
9 5
orientation is not within the purview of Title VII protection.
Upon consideration of these holdings, some authors have

189. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
190. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2)
(1964)).
191. See supra notes 40-103 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
Ninth Circuit referenced its opinion as to the possibility of allowing for such
protections under Title VII in its decision in DeSantis. See also infra notes 209-210
and accompanying text (noting that the DeSantis court specifically addressed this
possibility in dicta).
193. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir.
1978).
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit stated that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id. In this 1978 case, the true
issue was discrimination based on the potential employee's effeminacy, not his
sexual orientation. See id. The issue of effeminacy has not been revisited by the
Fifth Circuit in the twenty-four years that have passed since Smith.
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posited that a cause of action under Title VII for sexual
discrimination based on sexual orientation is inevitable. 196 As the
workforce dynamic continues to change, the courts will continue to
197
perceive these changes-some circuits more aptly than others.
When presented with the appropriate facts, the courts will
eventually extend Title VII's protection against discrimination
"because of sex" to sexual harassment on the basis of sexual
98
orientation.
Some courts will continue to struggle with their
jurisprudential homophobia while trying to conform to societal
growth and development. Even if these less than open-minded
courts resist growing with society at large, they will have to
eventually allow Title VII protection against sexual orientation
discrimination in order to continue to give effective protection from
gender-based
discrimination.199
The tendency of these
conservative courts has been to see sexual orientation
discrimination as "inextricably wedded to homosexuality." 200 This
causes courts to protect the harassers in these instances because of
the courts' value judgment that homosexuality is "devoid of social
benefit. 201 However, because of the close nexus between sexual
orientation and gender, courts that prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination will also often be protecting individuals from
gender discrimination. 20 2
If a court conflates effeminate
characteristics in a man or masculine characteristics in a woman
with homosexuality, thus deeming that person unprotected under
Title VII, then the court is essentially allowing gender
discrimination, clearly prohibited under Title VII, in order to make
its point that sexual orientation is not protected. In this manner,
the court would be burdening gender protection to support its
homophobia.2 03 As society continues to change, evolve, and
progress, gender and sexual orientation become more intertwined.

196. See, e.g., Beauford Demond Pines, Civil Rights: Interpretationof Title Vii's
Prohibition Against Sexual Discrimination: Recognition of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment in a Hostile Work Environment, 26 S.U. L. REV. 115, 137 (1998) (noting
that "[tihe recognition of sexual orientation harassment is inevitable").
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other Name... The Gender Basis of
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment,46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 520 (1998).
200. Id.
201. id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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In order to continue to prohibit gender discrimination under Title
VII, courts will inevitably have to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination. 204 Extending protection against sexual orientation
discrimination is necessary to avoid dilution of the protection
already afforded gender under Title VII. If the courts neglect their
duty to continue prohibiting gender discrimination under Title VII
by allowing this dilution, Title VII and its panoply of protections
will devolve into a limited form of relief, inconsistently applied,
205
until it eventually becomes completely impotent.
While the courts have typically refrained from addressing the
possibility of offering Title VII protection based on sexual
orientation, they have been known to broach this "Subject That
Dare Not Speak Its Name" in dicta. In Bibby, the Third Circuit
stated that "[h]arassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no
place in our society." 20 6 More importantly, the Third Circuit stated
that while the Oncale Court listed three specific instances in
which an action for same-sex sexual harassment may arise under
Title VII, these three instances are not an exclusive list of
20 7
circumstances under which such a cause of action may arise.
The Third Circuit further stated that other protections may be
available under the "because of sex" prong of Title VII. 20 8 One
does not have to stretch the meaning of the court's statements too
far to surmise that the Third Circuit would be amenable to
extending Title VII protections on the basis of sexual orientation.
In a fascinating historical twist, the Ninth Circuit voiced its
disapproval of sexual orientation discrimination in its 1979
DeSantis decision, which Azteca presumably referenced in its
defense in Nichols. 20 9 The DeSantis court stated that:
204. See Brookins, supra note 199, at 520.
205. In deconstructing the gender monolith, one must note that because of the
endlessly varying combinations of masculine and feminine characteristics, this new
extension of "sex" as gender stereotype can be applied to a variety of extremely
different employment situations. The scope of these situations ranges from the
effeminate waiter in Nichols to an employee much like Big Bear from the
introductory hypothetical-a homosexual who does not violate the traditional
gender monolith, with the notable exception of having a same-sex sexual partner,
itself a gender stereotype. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text for
further discussion and application to different employment situations.
206. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001); see
also supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (noting that dicta in Bibby
demonstrates the Third Circuit's willingness to take a progressive stance on samesex sexual harassment).
207. See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264.
208. See id.
209. See DeSantis v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
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While we do not express approval of an employment policy
that differentiates according to sexual preference, we note that
whether dealing with men or women the employer is using the
same criterion: it will not hire or promote a person who
does
prefers sexual partners of the same sex. Thus this policy
210
not involve different decisional criteria for the sexes.
Thus in 1979, the Ninth Circuit made it very clear that it did not
approve of discrimination based on sexual orientation, even
though it ultimately decided that Title VII did not prohibit it. In
2001, the Nichols court stated that "DeSantis is no longer good
law."2'1 In so doing, the Nichols court adopted as law the dicta
portion of the DeSantis decision that had earlier disapproved of
sexual orientation discrimination.
In Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,2 12 the First
Circuit added its dicta-voice to the chorus, stating that
harassment because of sexual orientation is a "noxious practice,
deserving of censure and opprobrium." 213 The First Circuit
refrained from extending Title VII protection to the plaintiff,
noting that the issue was not properly before the reviewing court,
because the plaintiff failed to raise the issue on motion for
The court stated that although it
summary judgment. 214
condemns discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it is
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and does not have
the authority to rule as it might choose.2 15 Although the First
Circuit recognizes that it alone cannot extend Title VII protections
to sexual orientation, its dicta in Higgins support such an
216
extension if made by the proper authority.
Even Justice Scalia may have implicitly allowed room for an
interpretation of Title VII that would prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 217 In the pertinent portion of the
Oncale opinion, Justice Scalia stated:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our
1979); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001)
(overruling the DeSantis holding that "discriminating based on a stereotype that a
man 'should have a virile rather than an effeminate appearance' does not fall
within Title VII's purview"(quoting DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331-32)).
210. Desantis,608 F.2d at 331.
211. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875.
212. 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999).
213. Id.
214. See id. at 259-60.
215. See id. at 259.
216. See id.

217. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
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precedents for. a categorical rule excluding same-sex
harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some
courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonablycomparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws ratherthan the principalconcerns of our legislators
by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion]
I . . because of . .. sex" in the "terms" or "conditions" of
employment.
Our holding that this includes sexual
harassment must extend to sexual harassment
of any kind
218
that meets the statutory requirements.
One can construe from this dicta that while Congress may not
have been concerned with sexual orientation discrimination, this
form of discrimination could also be considered a "reasonably
comparable evil" 219 to be remedied by Title VII. If it is deemed to
meet statutory requirements, Justice Scalia's dicta may also
encompass sexual harassment based on sexual orientation. In the
Oncale decision, Justice Scalia has laid the textualist groundwork
that will eventually facilitate the extension of Title VII protections
based on sexual orientation.
Scalia has stated that although
sexual orientation may not have been considered in the drafting of
Title VII, the "provisions of our laws" 220 found in the text of the
statute may cover sexual orientation discrimination as one of the
"reasonably comparable evils" that occur "because ...of sex . . . in
the 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment."22 1 In dicta, Scalia is
allowing for protection against any sexual harassment meeting the
statutory requirements of Title VII.222 The plain meaning of this
language "dictates" that if the Supreme Court addresses the issue
of sexual harassment based on sexual orientation, the Court will
be compelled to extend properly Title VII protections.
By addressing the possibility of extension of Title VII
protections based on sexual orientation, the Bibby court gave a
clear roadmap as to where its future analysis may lead,
verbalizing in dicta a viewpoint for future citation when the issue
of sexual orientation protection properly arises before the Third
Circuit. 223 While the Higgins court did not demonstrate the same

218. Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 79.
220. Id. at 80.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 80.
223. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 20:237

strategic forethought as the Third Circuit in Bibby, it did state its
disapproval of harassment based on sexual orientation. 224 This
leads the observer to believe that, given the opportunity, the First
Circuit would also extend Title VII protection based on sexual
orientation. In addition to appellate support for extending Title
VII protection to sexual orientation, Justice Scalia did not
preclude this possibility in his opinion in Oncale.2 25 Future court
holdings are often predicted by tracking consistent trends in
dicta. 226 If these statements are accurate indicators, it seems
apparent that "because of . . . sex" will eventually be held to
include sexual orientation, offering much-needed employment
protection for members of the GLBT community.
Conclusion: And Some of Them Lived Happily Ever After
Operating under the court's definition of "sex" as gender
stereotype, sexual orientation discrimination is a form of
discrimination "because of ...
sex." 227 A gender stereotype is
founded on traditional gender monoliths, which determine that
men must be attracted to women and women must be attracted to
men. 228 There is no room in this traditional stereotype for samesex sexual orientation.
Sex discrimination, with regard to gender stereotypes,
functions on the principle that traditional gender roles must be
enforced, to the exclusion of individuals who do not fulfill the
stereotype. 229 In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit took its direction from
the Supreme Court's holdings in Price Waterhouse and Oncale,
prohibiting this exclusionary sex stereotyping by offering Title VII
230
protection to those who fall outside of the gender monoliths.
Same-sex sexual orientation also falls outside of the monolithdictated gender stereotypes and should receive the same course of

224. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 217-222 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Chowdhury, M.D. v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 324
(3rd Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (stating that dicta serves as a tool for
predicting what the court might do when an issue is properly presented); see also
Conesco Indus., Ltd. v. Conforti & Eisele, Inc., 627 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting) (noting that great weight is to be accorded dictum from a
high level court which is thoroughly reasoned and explicitly and conclusively
expressed).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
228. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 74, at 236.
229. See supra notes 73-184 and accompanying text.
230. See Nichols v. Aztecs Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Title VII protection as offered Sanchez for his failure to fulfill the
stereotype. Through its decision in Nichols, the Ninth Circuit
opened a door that will lead to such a holding in the future,
creating the same Title VII protections for the GLBT community.
Returning to the office tower where Big Bear, Lady Bear, and
Little Bear work, we now know that both Lady Bear and Little
Bear will receive protection under Title VII for the workplace
Like the plaintiff in Price
harassment they have endured.
Waterhouse, Lady Bear will have a remedy available through Title
VII for her nonconformity to her gender stereotype. Little Bear
could be afforded Title VII protection from a hostile workplace in
the same manner as the plaintiff in Nichols, receiving protection
from harassment due to his effeminate characteristics. Because
Big Bear does not outwardly defy his gender stereotype with
effeminate mannerisms, Big Bear might be the only one of this trio
who remains without definite Title VII protection. If Big Bear
were fired because his employer claimed he could not perform his
job adequately due to his same-sex sexual orientation, he probably
would have a cause of action under Title VII after Nichols. But if
Big Bear were fired simply because his employer did not approve
of homosexuality, he would not be protected under Title VII. If the
courts were to include sexual orientation as a characteristic
included in the male and female gender stereotypes, then Big Bear
would be protected against sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII-and so would the entire GLBT community.

